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Abstract 
The hallmark of the recent development and growth literature is a quest to identify institutions 
that explain a significant portion of the observed differences in living standards across countries.  
Empirical work in the area focuses almost exclusively on either the global sample or on 
developing nations. Certainly it is important to know which institutions are lacking in these 
developing countries, but the analysis provides little evidence for us to know to what extend a 
common set of institutions actually matters in advanced and developing countries.  In this paper 
we examine parameter heterogeneity in prominent approaches to institutions and economic 
performance.  We find that a new set of instruments is necessary to control for endogeneity, but 
that a common set of economically important institutions does indeed exist among advanced and 
developing nations. The impact of these institutions does vary substantially across samples; it is 
about three times as high in developing countries as compared to OECD countries.   
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1. Introduction 
The hallmark of the recent development and growth literature is a quest to identify institutions 
that explain a significant portion of the observed differences in living standards across countries.1  
While the definitions of “institutions” may vary across studies, the results are consistent and 
strong: institutions explain economically and statistically significant differences in per capita 
incomes across countries.2  The set of countries under observation is at times dictated by data 
availability, but generally the literature examines either the global sample or developing 
countries.  The types of institutions that have been associated with economic performance 
commonly relate to measures of government risk of expropriation, rule of law, bureaucratic 
quality, corruption, government repudiation of contracts, civil liberties, and openness to trade. 
 Rather surprising is, however, the absence of a comprehensive literature that analyzes 
which institutions determine the economic fortunes in developed nations.  One might expect, for 
example, that the above cited institutions hardly vary across OECD countries - too little, perhaps, 
to provide insights into how these nations achieve and maintain their rank at the front of the 
income frontier. In this paper, we examine parameter heterogeneity as it relates to the influence 
of institutions on output in OECD and Non-OECD subsamples.  We seek to examine whether a 
set of institutions exists which contains explanatory power and economic influence in both 
subsamples.  
 While the literature provides ample guidance as to which institutions are commonly 
lacking in developing countries, there exists only a rudimentary understanding to what degree the 
same institutions actually matter in OECD countries. Research that focuses on advanced 
economies excludes the rest of the world; as a result, such studies focus on completely different 
                                                 
1 Depending on the dataset, income per worker differences are 35- or 94-fold (Hall and Jones, 1999 or Caselli, 
2005). 
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sets of institutions, such as labor market institutions (e.g., Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel, 2005, 
and Boeri, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta, 2000), traditional factor markets such as human and physical 
capital (e.g., Bassanini, Hemmings, and Scarpetta, 2001), product regulations (e.g., Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2003), conflict resolution procedures (De Grauwe and Skudenly, 1999 and Schneider 
and Wagner, 2001) or financial markets regulation (Carlina and Mayerb, 2001). It is undeniably 
true that these institutions are crucial determinants of economic performance in advanced 
countries.  Our focus is different; we seek to establish the impact of those institutions that have 
been shown to hold strong explanatory power in global regressions and to examine whether they 
also hold explanatory power in the OECD subsample.  The goal is to establish a set of 
institutions that matter not only in advanced or developing countries, but are fundamental 
determinants of economic performance in both. 
 Since we seek to investigate whether a set of institutions exists that matters across all 
countries, our point of departure is the Hall and Jones (1999) methodology which includes 
instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of institutions in a global, structural model.  
While their institutional quality measure is clearly correlated with income per worker in the 
global sample (see Figure 1), the simple OLS regression lines for the two subsamples indicate a 
differential impact in OECD countries as compared to the rest of the sample. OECD countries do 
seem to have a noticeably lower slope than Non-OECD countries. However, conclusive 
statements to that effect require solid analysis and extensive testing of robustness and 
endogeneity.  
 To address issues of parameter heterogeneity we employ two approaches. First, we split 
the sample and second, we use the interaction methodology of Brock and Durlauf (2001), who 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 For prominent examples of definitions of “institutions,” “economic institutions,” “social infrastructure,” or 
“structural policies” see Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Hall 
and Jones (1999) or Persson (2004), respectively.  
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applied this approach after calling into question whether institutional indices can reasonably be 
expected to exhibit parameter homogeneity across “complex heterogeneous objects such as 
countries.”  Specifically, they cite the case of the United States and Russia, where Civil Liberties 
data can hardly be seen to have a similar impact on economic performance. 
 Our results are not limited to a simple assessment of the impact of established institutions 
on output in global and OECD samples.  As we examine parameter heterogeneity, we find that 
the established instruments are invalid when we split the sample into OECD and Non-OECD 
countries.  This forces us to consider a new set of appropriate instruments in order to 
successfully control for endogeneity in all subsamples before we can examine the economic 
impact of institutions on output.  
 Our new set of instruments is based on the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis.  The 
hypothesis is laid out in detail in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and similar 
approaches have provided empirical validation for such a hierarchy (see Persson, 2004, 2005 and 
Eicher and Schreiber, 2005). The basic argument is that the constitutional institutions/political 
rules set the stage for the economic institutions.  We thus divide institutions into two dimensions: 
constitutional/political institutions to serve as instruments, and economic institutions that are 
thought to exert direct effects on output.  
 Extensive robustness analysis confirms that the set of established economic institutions is 
indeed highly significant and holds great explanatory power in both OECD and Non-OECD 
countries. However, evidence for parameter heterogeneity is strong. We show that these 
economic institutions matter significantly more in Non-OECD countries than in the global 
sample, and about two thirds less in OECD than in Non-OECD countries. This highlights that the 
estimates obtained in the previous literature for the global sample are a weighted average of the 
impact of institutions on economic performance in advanced and developing countries.   
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 The new set of political instruments that we propose performs strongly across 
subsamples, and our results are shown to be robust to a number of alternative specifications and 
tests.  The coefficient estimates for the political instruments are highly significant in all 
subsamples indicating the important impact of such institutions on the fabric of economic 
institutions in both advanced and developing nations.  
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2  first motivates the investigation into 
parameter heterogeneity for both instruments and economic institutions.  Here we utilize the Hall 
and Jones (1999) framework and examine two main subsamples: OECD-members and non-
members and show how the established instruments fail in section 2.1. Section 2.2 introduces 
alternative instruments based on the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis. Section 3 consists of a 
series of robustness checks which examine different time periods, datasets and samples, before 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Parameter Heterogeneity in Instruments and Institutions 
2.1 Established Instruments and Institutions 
We approach parameter heterogeneity sequentially, first examining the possibility of 
heterogeneity in the instruments, and subsequently focusing on economic institutions. This 
progression is necessary because we must establish valid instruments across samples (Global, 
OECD, and Non-OECD). In the absence of valid instruments, the investigation of the impact of 
economic institutions on output is tarnished by endogeneity bias. Parameter heterogeneity would 
bias the global regressions even further. 
 Among the established instruments for economic institutions, immediate candidates for 
parameter heterogeneity relate to the notion of Western European historical influence.  Hall and 
Jones (1999) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) provide extensive motivation and historical 
analysis, respectively, to support the use of those instruments that relate to specific European 
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development influences (e.g., Europeans either settled the countries or the countries speak a 
European language). 3 The idea is that the colonizers and immigrants brought along with them 
the basic prerequisites to establish those economic institutions that are conducive to economic 
development. 
 For OECD countries the instruments relating to European languages can only be justified 
if they exhibit sufficient exogenous identifying variation and if they retain similar explanatory 
power as in the global sample. In addition, the validity of these instruments is directly related to 
how well they can be motivated.  Since most OECD countries were the source of the influence 
that the instruments are supposed to measure, the motivation is called into question.  
Specifically, measuring the positive influence of a country’s own historical experience upon 
itself makes for weak instruments.  
 A similar line of reasoning raises questions about Latitude (distance from the equator) as 
an appropriate instrument for OECD countries. Certainly, the preference of European settlers to 
emigrate to similar Latitudes can be seen as a strong motivation for Latitude’s influence on 
economic institutions in developing nations. However, one might argue that, by definition, 
Latitude holds little power in OECD countries – most of whom were the very source of the 
settlers. 
 The last instrument Hall and Jones (1999) employ is the Frankel and Romer (1996, 1999) 
Implied Trade Share for a country. This measure provides geography-based explanations for 
trade derived from a gravity approach. Deviations from the implied trade share could thus signal 
weak, protectionist institutions. While this instrument may appear most suitable for different sub-
                                                 
3 Hall and Jones (1999) refer to English, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish languages and Western Europe’s 
discovery of “the ideas of Adam Smith, the importance of property rights, and the system of checks and balances in 
government.” 
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groups of countries, protectionism has been uniformly low in OECD countries which leads us to 
suspect that the variable will hold little explanatory power for subsamples of countries. 
 We commence with simple diagnostics to ascertain the validity of instruments and 
economic institutions across OECD and Non-OECD subsamples.  Subsequently, we address the 
core issue at hand: are the relevant economic institutions in OECD countries similar to those in 
the rest of the world?  This question has two dimensions.  First, we may ask if there exists a 
common set of economic institutions that determines income in OECD and Non-OECD 
countries.  Certainly, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, 
government repudiation of contracts, and openness to trade (the components of Hall and Jones‘ 
(1999) “social infrastructure” index) are key traits for development.  However, in developed 
nations, by definition, one might be skeptical whether these types of economic institutions are 
indeed the relevant ones.  If a common set of economic institutions exists, the second dimension 
examines whether their influence on output is uniform across OECD and Non-OECD countries. 
 To establish a benchmark, we follow the methodology introduced by Hall and Jones 
(1999), who explore the effects of institutions on output by examining the structural model 
     log /Y L Iα β ε= + + ,   (1)  
where Y/L denotes income per worker and I is the measure of economic institutional quality. 
Recognizing that economic institutions are potentially endogenous to income, apart from being 
determined by a vector of exogenous factors, X, a regression identifying institutions is specified 
as 
     ηθδγ +++= XLYI /log .   (2) 
Due to the possible endogeneity of economic institutions, the OLS estimation of equation (1) 
establishes neither causality nor unbiased coefficients. Hall and Jones (1999) therefore provide 
instruments designed to solve the endogeneity problem.  Candidates for instruments are selected 
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from the vector of exogenous covariates, X, in equation (2).  We adopt their instrumental variable 
estimation strategy to achieve identification and unbiased estimates.4  
 Valid instruments fulfill two criteria: they are i) uncorrelated with the error term in 
equation (1), and ii) strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor, I. The two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation can then be specified as  
       I Xγ θ η♦ = + +     (3) 
     log /Y L Iα β ε♦= + + ,   (4)  
where X  is a subset of X and equations (3) and (4) represent the first and second stage 
regressions, respectively. 
 The 2SLS regression (I) in Table 1 replicates the Hall and Jones (1999) results for the 
global sample, where instruments are successful, in the sense that most regressors in the first 
stage are highly significant, the adjusted R-squared is satisfactorily high, and in that the 
overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected.  
[Table 1 here] 
Hall and Jones’ (1999) compelling motivation of Latitude, Implied Trade Shares, and the 
fraction of the population which speaks European languages as instruments is reflected in these 
instruments’ strong performance in the global sample. Not only is the first stage strong, but 
instrumented institutions are highly significant and explain large differences in per capita income 
across countries.  
 As a first exploration of parameter heterogeneity to uncover possible differing effects of 
instruments and institutions in the OECD subsample, we add a region dummy, D, to the 2SLS 
regression (I). This modifies the structural model to: 
                                                 
4 As pointed out by Hall and Jones (1999), a valid IV strategy can also address measurement error and omitted 
variable bias of OLS estimates.  
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       I X Dγ θ ξ η♦ = + + +     (5) 
     i log /Y L I Dα β ζ ε♦= + + +    (6)  
The 2SLS regression (II) in Table 1 reports that the OECD dummy is indeed highly significant in 
the first stage.  In addition, the introduction of a regional dummy changes the explanatory power 
of instrumented institutions significantly.  Having accounted for OECD specific effects, only two 
of the original four Hall and Jones instruments remain significant.  The Implied Trade Share 
actually gains significance, moving from 10 to 1 percent levels, while the significance of 
European Languages and Latitude is greatly reduced.  The explanatory power of Latitude 
changes dramatically.  It looses its 1 percent significance from the 2SLS regression (I) and shows 
no statistically significant impact on economic institutions in the 2SLS regression (II). Perhaps 
some of the explanatory power of the instruments in the global sample was derived from the fact 
that the instruments differed systematically across subsamples.   
 The fit of the first stage rises strongly as the adjusted R-squared improves, indicating an 
increase in the power of the instruments from the 2SLS regression (I) to the 2SLS regression 
(II). The introduction of the region dummy thus improves the fit of the first stage significantly, 
while the established instruments loose power.  This provides additional evidence that the region 
dummy actually drives the results in the 2SLS regression (II).  In addition, the Sargan Over-ID 
Test is now rejected, which raises further doubts about the validity of this particular set of 
instrumental variables. 
 The second stage holds two additional surprises.  First, the OECD dummy is not 
significant, which indicates the absence of OECD specific effects in the determination of income 
levels. Second, the measure of institutions remains highly significant with hardly a change in the 
point estimate, as compared to Hall and Jones’ (1999) original specification. The same is true for 
the fit of the second stage which is just marginally below the fit of the Hall and Jones (1999) 
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regression. 5  We must consider the second stage preliminary, however, since the estimates in 
equation (6) are potentially contaminated with endogeneity bias, given the weak performance of 
the first stage of the 2SLS regression (II).  With this caveat in mind, we do note that the 
regression indicates that economic institutions are indeed important in accessing output in the 
global sample. The rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, 
government repudiation of contracts, and openness to trade do seem to matter just as much for 
OECD countries as for the world.  
 Since the OECD dummy lacks explanatory power while economic institutions are highly 
significant, it is tempting to conclude that there exists little evidence for parameter heterogeneity 
in economic institutions. However, the estimation of their effect on income levels is only valid to 
the degree that the instruments can be established as appropriate. The first stage of the 2SLS 
regression (II) highlights that the instruments lack not only a compelling intuitive motivation for 
OECD countries, but also explanatory power.  Perhaps most importantly, the instruments are 
neither uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1) (the Sargan Test is not accepted), nor are 
the four established instruments strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor, I. The first 
stage of regression (II) thus casts substantial doubt on the validity of the results obtained in the 
second stage regression; in addition, the presence of a highly significant OECD dummy in the 
first stage provides strong evidence of parameter heterogeneity in the instruments. 
 To explore the issue of instrument heterogeneity head on, we proceed to split the sample 
and examine OECD and Non-OECD subsamples separately in Table 2.  The purpose is to isolate 
the impact of the established instruments and the explanatory power of economic institutions 
across the respective subsamples. 
                                                 
5 We choose to report the second stage R-squared as an indicator of the fit, although it does not possess statistical 
meaning in the context of 2SLS/IV, since it measures the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is 
accounted for by the fitted explanatory variables. 
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[Table 2 here] 
 The 2SLS regression (III) provides further reason to doubt that the established 
instruments are appropriate for the case of the OECD sample. Of all four instruments, only 
Latitude remains weakly significant at the 10% level in the first stage.  This is especially 
surprising since Latitude had lost explanatory power when we introduced the OECD dummy to 
the global sample in the 2SLS regression (II). The adjusted R-square drops sharply in the first 
stage, and the Over-ID Test is also rejected. All this points to further problems related to either 
weak or inappropriate instruments for the subsamples. 
 The coefficient on economic institutions remains highly significant in the 2SLS 
regression (III), but its magnitude is reduced to about one third of the size obtained in the global 
sample.  The fit for the second stage regression also improves sharply.  After considering the 
caveat that the economic institutions estimate may be contaminated by endogeneity bias, the 
second stage indicates that institutions do exert a positive effect on output in OECD countries, 
albeit a substantially smaller one.   
 We expected that the Non-OECD sample in the 2SLS regression (IV) would retain 
similar explanatory power as in the original Hall and Jones results in the 2SLS regression (I). 
The instruments were well motivated for the developing world, and the sample now excludes 
OECD countries for which the instruments have been shown to lack statistical power as well as 
economic intuition.  From this point of view, one could even hope to see that the explanatory 
power of the institutions for the subset of developing countries should be enhanced. However, 
the results in the 2SLS regression (IV) are disappointing. Surprisingly, all instruments except the 
Implied Trade Share loose significance. The fit of the first stage approaches white noise 
indicating to our surprise that the instruments perform even worse than in the OECD sample. As 
in the case of OECD countries, the Over-ID Test is rejected in the 2SLS regression (IV). While 
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the coefficient on economic institutions in the second stage remains highly significant, the 
adjusted R-squared is practically reduced to zero.  Note that the coefficient on institutions in the 
Non-OECD sample rises slightly compared to the coefficient in the global sample (2SLS 
regression I). Given the weak performance of the first stage, however, we cannot view the 
second stage results as reliable. 
 In exploring whether the established instruments are valid for OECD countries, we 
therefore, quite inadvertently, uncover their weakness in both subsamples. Surprising is that the 
convincingly motivated instruments for the Non-OECD subsample are also ultimately rejected 
on the basis of the lack of both, significance and identification.  One might suspect that the result 
is an artifact of having picked an unfortunate division of the global dataset. Therefore, we 
conducted the same exercise with qualitatively similar sample splits according to the World 
Bank classification of High/Medium/Low Income Countries.  The results in (Va), (Vb), (VIa) 
and (VIb) are almost identical as in regressions (III) and (IV). The results in regressions (III) and 
(IV) are robust to different splits of the global data as the instruments lack significance and fail 
the Over-ID Test in all alternative subsamples reported in Table 2.6  
 Perhaps the findings in Table 2 provide a deeper understanding of why the Hall and 
Jones’ (1999) instruments do not perform strongly in the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) sample, which is dominated by former colonies. They show that colonial origins (proxied 
by settler mortality) as an instrument for economic institutions (in their case government 
expropriation risk) improves the 2SLS estimation compared to Hall and Jones’ (1999) 
instruments. Since Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) focus only on former colonies, 
their approach cannot be utilized to solve the endogeneity problem in OECD sample, which is 
comprised largely of the nations of origin of the settlers.   
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 The analysis leaves the discussion regarding the impact of economic institutions on 
growth at a crossroads. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have shown that economic 
institutions do matter for a set of 69 developing countries that are distinguished by their colonial 
history.  On the other hand, we are left without guidance as to which – if any – economic 
institutions of the type discussed in Hall and Jones (1999) matter to the long-run performance of 
highly developed countries.  In the next section we set out to find alternative instruments that are 
valid for OECD countries, and to test their explanatory power for the Non-OECD sample.  
 
2.2 The Hierarchy of Institutions Hypothesis 
 
In search of alternative instruments that control for endogeneity of economic institutions in both 
the global and the OECD samples, we turn to political institutions.  The recent institutions 
literature has begun to draw a clear distinction between political and economic institutions. 
Williamson (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
and Roland (2004), all posit a hierarchy of institutions which we will utilize below. While 
economic institutions determine economic performance, they are themselves influenced both 
directly and indirectly by political institutions.  The direct effect of political institutions stems, 
for example, from the concentration of political power in the hands of a malevolent dictator, who 
dismantles the economic institutions which ensure property rights and equal opportunity.  
Political institutions may also affect economic institutions indirectly, since they determine the 
distribution of de jure political power which, in turn, assigns the power to alter economic 
institutions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Note that the results are confirmed when we control for the small size of the OECD subsample as we bootstrap 
regressions in section 3.2. 
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 While political institutions may not affect output directly, constitutions are not written in 
stone.  They change slowly but exhibit great persistence over time, for example, as countries 
evolve from dictatorships to democracy (and vice versa). Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2005) argue that political institutions are collective choices; hence the distribution of political 
power in society is the key determinant of their evolution. Persistence is introduced by those 
holding political power, who find it in their interest to maintain the status quo even at significant 
economic cost for society as a whole.  
 Persson (2004, 2005) and Eicher and Schreiber (2005) report empirical evidence for the 
hierarchy of constitutions, by employing specific constitutional variables as instruments for 
economic institutions.  We follow the same method below. The instruments perform well 
because they are slow moving and because their direct impact on output is negligible. As a 
practical matter, this can be established in our regressions (see footnote 10).  Glaeser et al (2004) 
also argue forcefully against a direct link between output and political institutions.  Nonetheless, 
we are careful to examine our results in a robustness section below to confirm that they do not 
hinge on the assumption that political institutions are entirely exogenous.  We allow for the 
existence of long-term feedback effects from economic outcomes to constitutions in our 
robustness section. Specifically we introduce alternative political and constitutional instruments 
that are even less likely to be contaminated by endogeneity.  
 To examine whether the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis provides successful 
instruments, we augment the original Hall and Jones (1999) dataset with a number of political 
institutions provided by the Polity IV database,  the World Bank, and the International Country 
Risk Guide. From Polity IV we select the Constraints on the Chief Executive (“Executive 
Constraints” below) and Chief Executive Recruitment Regulation (“Executive Recruitment 
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Regulation”) for 1988, the year predating our data on income per worker. 7 For robustness we 
also include additional Polity IV variables, Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral 
Competitiveness in 1975 from the Database on Political Institutions (World Bank), Voice and 
Accountability from the “Government Matters” database (World Bank), Type and Age of 
Democracies (as derived by Persson, 2004 from Polity IV), and variables which reflect legal 
origins (e.g., the German and Scandinavian legal origins significant in La Porta et al 2004, and 
Levine Loayza and Beck 2000), judicial independence and Constitutional Review (e.g., rigidity 
of the constitution, judges’ influences over the legislative branch) from La Porta et al (2004). 
The addition of political institutions reduces the size of our baseline dataset from 127 to 114.8 
 Table A2 in the appendix shows that the economic institutions which comprise Hall and 
Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure variable and our proxies for political institutions are quite 
distinct.   Factor analysis on the entire institutional dataset shows that the variables span different 
dimensions of the dataspace and separate nicely into one economic factor (given by the social 
infrastructure variables) and two political factors. 
 Table A1 indicates a high correlation among the political variables.  To avoid problems 
of multicollinearity, we choose Executive Constraints and Executive Recruitment Regulation as 
our baseline instruments, because these two variables have been used extensively in the 
literature.9 In our robustness section we examine whether our results depend on a particular 
selection of political institutions.  Table 3 reports the results when using our preferred political 
institutions as instruments in the global sample. 
                                                 
7 Polity IV variables included are the Polity2 index, Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Good Democracy, 
Political Competition, Competitiveness of (Political) Participation, Executive Recruitment Regulation, Executive 
Electoral Competition, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Regime Durability and Regulation of Participation. 
8 The excluded countries are Barbados, Cape Verde Islands, Hong Kong, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, Namibia, 
Puerto Rico, Reunion, Seychelles, Suriname, Yemen, and Zaire. 
9 These particular variables have been featured prominently in empirical institutional assessments of Persson, 
Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), 
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[Table 3 here] 
The 2SLS regression (VII) shows that both instruments are highly significant and that their first 
stage fit is similar to the benchmark in Hall and Jones (1999) as reported in the 2SLS regression 
(I). The Over-ID Test is accepted and the political instruments perform strongly as previously 
shown in different contexts by Persson (2004, 2005) and Eicher Schreiber (2005).10  The 
coefficient on economic institutions in the second stage is also similar to the one reported in Hall 
and Jones (1999).11   
 For robustness we also pair our political institutions with Hall and Jones’ (1999) 
instruments in the 2SLS regression (VIII) to show that the former retain their explanatory power 
once the additional regressors are included in the first stage. In addition, the C Test (Difference-
In-Sargan-Test) allows us to test a subset of the original orthogonality conditions in order to 
establish the exogeneity of our new instruments (to test our instruments against Hall and Jones’) 
in the 2SLS regression (VIII) and is also accepted. Thus we can claim that in the global sample 
our new instruments perform at least as well as those of Hall and Jones (1999). 
 While we have found that political institutions are both strong and exogenous instruments 
for economic institutions, parameter heterogeneity may still be an issue.  The fact that 
institutions matter in the global sample, as shown above, does not provide a guarantee that they 
work across subsamples. The 2SLS regression (IX) highlights that the effect of political 
institutions does differ across the samples due to the significant OECD dummy.  Nevertheless, in 
contrast to the 2SLS regression (III), the new instruments do not loose their validity; they remain 
highly significant and pass the Over-ID Test.  The fact that the dummy retains its significance in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Acemoglu et al (2003), Gleaser et al (2004) Djankov et al (2002) and Alfaro, Kalelmi-Ozcan, and Volosovych 
(2005). 
10 Like Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), we also used the cruder approach of adding the instruments 
into the second stage regressions to show that they only influence output through their effect on economic 
institutions. Indeed, we always find them to be insignificant if added to the second stage. 
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the first stage does raise the question however, of whether there is a systematic difference in the 
influence of political institutions on economic ones in the OECD vs. Non-OECD samples.  We 
explore such potential parameter heterogeneity more thoroughly in Table 4.   
[Table 4 here] 
 We can examine parameter heterogeneity from two perspectives. First, we split the global 
sample in regressions (X) and (XII).  To avoid loosing information as we move to the subsample 
analysis, we alternatively examine parameter heterogeneity by adding an interaction term to the 
global sample which interacts instruments and institutions with the region dummy. 
       I X D XDγ θ ξ ι η♦ = + + + +    (7) 
     log /Y L I D I Dα β ζ ν ε♦ ♦= + + + +   (8)  
Following Brock and Durlauf (2001) the coefficients on institutions in regressions (XI) and 
(XIII) are composite coefficient estimates and standard errors for I♦+ I♦D.  The results in 
regressions (XI) and (XIII) thus take advantage of all information contained in the global dataset, 
while representing the subsample specific effects of economic institutions on output.  
 Table 4 presents three important results.  First, parameter heterogeneity is confirmed to 
be of statistic and economic significance, no matter whether the sample is split (regressions X, 
XII) or not (regressions XI, XIII).  In either case, the results are significant and stable across 
methods in the sense that the coefficients in the interacted, global sample are just about identical 
to the ones obtained in the subsample estimation. The significance of the region dummies 
provides clear evidence for parameter heterogeneity.  
 The second important aspect of Table 4 is that political institutions perform well as 
instruments across all samples. While only one of the two instruments is significant, there is 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 If we reduce the Hall and Jones (1999) 2SLS regression (1) to the same 114 countries, we obtain a coefficient for 
economic institutions of 5.46.   
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strong evidence that the hierarchy of institutions approach does provide sufficiently strong 
instruments for economic institutions in each subsample.  The adjusted R-square is extremely 
high across methods and samples (with the exception of first stage in the pure Non-OECD 
subsample) and the Over-ID Tests are accepted throughout.   
 The third key implication of Table 4 is that the influence of social infrastructure on 
output is obtained with considerable precision; it is about three times larger for Non-OECD 
countries than for OECD countries.  This result is akin to our preliminary finding in Table 2.  
The smaller coefficient for OECD countries suggests that economic institutions play a smaller, 
yet equally significant role in determining output in OECD countries as compared to the global 
or Non-OECD samples. Of course, the income gap between OECD countries (eight-fold in 1970 
according to the Penn World tables) is also much smaller than the 30-fold gap between the 
richest and the poorest nations in the global sample. For the Non-OECD sample, the importance 
of the economic institutions, namely, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, government repudiation of contracts, openness to trade, is now significantly 
greater than in the OECD sample. 
 The magnitude of the IV-estimate for the impact of economic institutions in the global 
sample (regression VII) lies between those for the OECD and Non-OECD samples in the 2SLS 
regressions (XI) and (XIII), which is intuitive. The new instruments thus deliver a similar result 
across samples as the slopes in our Figure 1 indicated initially: the economic institutions 
included in the Hall and Jones (1999) social infrastructure index certainly have a larger impact in 
developing countries. Hence it is no surprise that the coefficient is greatest in the developing 
country sample, and somewhat lower for OECD countries. The estimate for the combined effect 
of the two datasets which make up the global sample should then lie in the middle. 
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 While the size of the coefficient is smaller for the OECD, it is interesting to see that 
institutions explain a larger share of the variation in OECD income as compared to institutions in 
the Non-OECD sample. The R squared for the OECD countries ranges from 60 to 76 percent 
while it is only 52 to 60 percent in the Non-OECD sample. Thus one might be surprised not only 
how important economic institutions are in the OECD, but also how precisely they forecast 
income levels in these countries.  
 While searching for better instruments that are valid for key subsamples of the global 
dataset, we therefore uncovered important support for the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis in 
both subsamples and in the global dataset.  In the process we come to the surprising conclusion 
that the type of social infrastructure identified by Hall and Jones (1999) does play a significant 
role even in advanced OECD economies, which are often seen as representing the gold standard 
in terms of control of corruption, rule of law and free, well-functioning markets. Interestingly, 
the impact of such institutions in OECD countries is significant, but about two thirds smaller 
than in Non-OECD countries.  
 In the next section, we examine how robust our results are to alternative datasets, 
alternative measures of economic institution, different groupings of countries, and to 
specifications that investigate whether current political institutions are truly exogenous.  
3. Robustness 
3.1 Alternative Instrument Specifications 
 An important aspect of our investigation has been the classification of political 
institutions as exogenous with respect to output levels.  However, the income level regressions 
capture long lasting effects of both political and economic institutional changes that may 
accumulate over time.  While the hierarchy of institutions posits that there is no direct effect of 
economic outcomes in a particular year on political institutions and constitutions, it is certainly 
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possible to imagine that there are feedback effects between economic outcomes and the 
distribution of power.  
 We cannot capture evidence for such feedback effects in our sample when we add the 
political institutions to the second stage (the coefficients on political institutions are insignificant 
in this case).  An alternative method to establish that our instruments are largely exogenous to 
output in 1989 is to use political institutions that substantially predate 1989 income. In our case 
we can trace our political institutions back to 1900, 88 years prior to our political instruments 
above. If endogeneity did exist in the case of 1989 income levels and 1988 political institutions, 
it would arguably be a lot smaller for 1989 income levels and institutions in 1900. 
[Table 5 here] 
The results for both the OECD and global samples in Table 5 are strong, even with the 89 year 
lag in political institutions.  Both political institutions are highly significant in the global sample, 
which is reduced to 46 countries due to data constraints, and due to the fact that a number of 
countries did not exist in 1900.  The global estimate for the impact of economic institutions on 
output is again higher in the global than in the OECD sample.  The instruments pass the Over-ID 
Test for all samples. However, the Non-OECD regression (XVI) is weak overall, with low R 
squares, and no significant coefficients.  While one might expect that the lack of power is due to 
small sample size, the result is equally weak if we use the Durlauf et al (2001) method of 
interacting institutions with region dummies to detect parameter heterogeneity while preserving 
the variation contained in the whole sample.  Therefore, the results are due to the particular set of 
countries that is included in the 24 Non-OECD countries in 1900.  The noticeable difference 
across all samples as compared to Table 4 is the reduction of the impact of economic institutions 
on output.   
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 An alternative robustness check regarding the choice of political variables that we 
employ above is to examine alternative instruments instead of alternative time periods.  Above 
we used Executive Recruitment Regulation and Executive Constraints due to their prevalence in 
the institutions literature, and because the data can be traced back to 1900.  Instead of selecting 
any number of variables among the universe of possible political institutions, Table 6 reports 
regressions based on the information contained in all 16 political institutions that we identified as 
potential candidates for instruments. Since the political data is highly correlated (Table A1), we 
perform factor analysis on the global sample.  We identify the two dominant factors (e.g., 
eigenvalues exceed unity) and report them along with their factor loadings in Table A3.  The 
commonalities among the variables which play important roles in the two factors are such that 
we label factor 1 Democratic Rules and factor 2 Participation/Stability. 
[Table 6 here] 
The use of all possible political variables increases the power of the estimations significantly 
across all samples. In regressions (XVII) to (IXX) the same pattern emerges as above, where the 
global sample indicates a significant impact of economic institutions on output which lies 
between the significant estimates for OECD and the Non-OECD countries.  With the exception 
of Participation/Stability for the Non-OECD Sample, all estimates are highly significant, no 
matter which subsample or political factor we consider.  The political instruments are again 
strong and uncorrelated with the error term in the global as well as the two subsamples. The 
factor analysis also improves the first stage in terms of significance and fit. Aside from the fact 
that we are utilizing information contained in all 16 variables, rather than just two, the improved 
fit might also be a function of the fact that institutions are probably measured with error, which is 
mitigated by the factor analysis. 
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 As an additional robustness experiment we also examine specific sets of political 
institutions that have featured prominently in the political, constitutional, legal and economic 
institutions analysis of Persson (2004) and La Porta et al (2004).12 Persson (2004) uses two main 
instruments: Form of Democratic Government (whether an established democracy is a 
presidential or majoritarian system) and Age of Democracy. These two political institutions are 
employed as instruments in Table 7. 
[Table 7 here] 
 The Persson instruments for political institutions perform well across all subsamples. The 
Over-ID Test is accepted, the instruments are strong and the fit is good. Note, however, that the 
estimates of the influence of economic institutions on output levels are reduced for the global 
and Non-OECD samples. Nonetheless, their magnitudes are still quite similar to the ones 
obtained with our preferred instruments in Table 4. 
 A prominent alternative to purely political institutions is provided by La Porta et al 
(2004), who emphasize the importance of constitutional variables that regulate the legal and 
judicial system as determinants of economic and political freedoms.  We explore the judicial 
dimension of constitutions in our robustness by using key variables from La Port et al (2004) 
which relate to Legal Origin, Duration of Supreme Court Judge Tenure, and Judicial Power 
(whether judges hold power to review constitutionality of laws).13  
 As in the case of our purely political constitutional variables above, we argue that these 
legal instruments are valid because they are, at best, slow moving over time. In fact, the legal 
origins can be argued to be just as predetermined as the colonial experience invoked by both Hall 
and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Such constitutional variables 
                                                 
12 We thank Torsten Persson for making his dataset available to us. La Porta et al (2004) data is available on their 
websites.  
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have usually been in place for long time spans and rarely change. Table 8 provides results using 
the legal constitutional variables as instruments.  
[Table 8 here] 
 The Legal constitutional instruments perform strongly in the global sample in regression 
(XXIII). However, in the subsample estimation in regressions (XXIV and XXV), the first stages 
for OECD and Non-OECD countries are weak and do not perform as well as the political 
instruments introduced above. Again the OECD subsample coefficient estimate for institutions is 
smaller than for the global and Non-OECD sample.  However, the Non-OECD subsample is 
measured with considerable error. While the instruments are still passing the Sargan Over-ID 
Test, only German Legal Origins are actually significant and the institution coefficient in the 
second stage is significant only at the 10 percent level.  Since the Non-OECD sample is reduced 
to 36 observations only, it is tempting to attribute the weakness of the results to the small sample 
size.  However, Durlauf et al (2001) interaction of a region dummy with the institutions does not 
solve the issue (not reported here).  One might be led to conclude that judicial institutions may be 
of significance in developed countries, but that their influence is weaker than political 
institutions for developing countries (see Tables 4 and 6).  
 
3.2 Outliers and Small Samples 
 The OECD sample size is small, which raises the question of whether outliers such as 
Turkey, Mexico, and Korea influence the results.  Turkey and Mexico are not in the World 
Bank’s classification of High Income countries (used above), and we are, after all, interested in 
the contributions of economic institutions to output in highly developed countries.  In this 
section, we provide outlier robust regression estimates for the first and second stage regressions 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Note that these instruments do not relate to legal enforcement, which could be argued to be dependent on funds 
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above which use the OECD country sample. Table 9 reports estimations that attribute less weight 
to observations that feature large residuals.  These regressions are meant to ensure that our 
results are not driven by unrepresentative outlying observations.    
[Table 9] 
 The outlier robust results in regressions (III’), (X’), (XV’) and (XVIII’) reinforce our 
earlier results with coefficients that are in line with the estimates in (III), (X), (XV) and (XVIII). 
The regressions indicate that our OECD results are not driven by a small subset of 
unrepresentative countries in the small sample.  The Hall and Jones’ (1999) specification of 
instruments in (III’) does not perform well as the estimates’ significance and magnitudes are 
greatly reduced.  This indicates not only that the instruments fail, but also that the impact of 
economic institutions on output is estimated with great uncertainty when inadequate instruments 
are employed in the OECD subsample. The regressions involving political institutions (X’, XV’ 
and XVIII’) are, however, robust and they exhibit equivalent magnitudes and significance levels 
as the baseline regressions (X, XV, XVIII).  We thus conclude that our results are not negatively 
impacted by the small sample size or unrepresentative outliers. 
 The size of the OECD sample also raises doubts about the stability of the estimators.  To 
address this issue we perform bootstrapped standard errors and confidence bands of our OECD 
estimates. 
[Table 10] 
Table 10 reports that bootstrapping reduces the power of the first stage across the board, but not 
to the degree that our essential insights derived above would have to be altered. All instruments 
that were significant above remain significant, although usually at lower levels.  The impact of 
institutions on output is not impacted, and only in the case of economic institutions from 1900 is 
                                                                                                                                                             
and thus per capita income. 
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the significance of the estimate reduced to the 5 percent level. Indeed these exercises highlight 
just how robust the explanatory power and the stability of the coefficient estimates are across 
different instruments and estimation methods for the OECD subsample.  We thus conclude that 
our results are robust to alternative specifications of the instruments, as well as to alternative 
estimation techniques.  
 
3.3 Alternative Economic Institutions  
All of our results above have so far been conditional on the use of the Hall and Jones’ (1999) 
social infrastructure data as the proxy for economic institutions. The variable is not 
uncontroversial, because it consists of only a few institutions chosen from a large set of potential 
candidates.  The literature on economic institutions and the empirical indicators that have been 
employed is surveyed in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005).  In this robustness section, 
we examine whether our results are perhaps related to a specific choice of economic institutions 
in the second stage.  
 Following the publication of Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001, 2002, and 2005) established property rights and checks against government power as an 
important measure of economic institutions.  As an additional robustness check, we seek to 
examine whether the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) Risk of Expropriation variable 
(International Country Risk Guide, averaged over 1985-1995) may also serve as a proxy for 
economic institutions in our global and OECD samples.14  We use the McArthur and Sachs 
(2000) dataset to expand the original Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) dataset from 69 
to over 105 countries (including OECD members).  
                                                 
14 Risk of Expropriation measures differences in institutions due to different types of states and state policies. 
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 Table 11 shows that the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis performs well and that 
political institutions are strong instruments for Risk of Expropriation across all samples.   
[Table 11 here] 
 Both of our political instruments are significant and the Over-Id Test is accepted in all 
subsamples. Interestingly, different political institutions matter now for different subsamples. In 
the global sample, both Executive Constraint and Executive Recruitment matter. However in 
former colonies, only the Executive Constraints matters, while in OECD countries Executive 
Recruitment is significant. The fit of the first stage is quite high for all samples other than the 
Non-OECD first stage.  The second stage exhibits statistically significant coefficients for 
economic institutions in all subsamples.  Again, the OECD estimates regarding the impact of 
economic institutions lies below that of the Non-OECD sample.   
 We can compare the coefficient estimate in the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
baseline regressions (2001, table 4, p. 1386) with our result for the same sample of countries in 
the 2SLS regression (XXVII).  Our political institution instruments perform well for the 
subgroup of former colonies, and we find that the instruments lead to a very similar coefficient in 
the second stage as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, which is 0.94 in their baseline 
specification).  Even the fit of the first stage is about as good as the 0.27 reported in Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001).  We can conclude that the political instruments are strong not 
only across country samples, but also across different proxies for the economic institutions. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 We examine the impact of economic institutions on economic performance across OECD 
and Non-OECD subsamples. The goal is to ascertain if the results derived from studies using 
global datasets readily translate to high income countries. While the relationship between 
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economic institutions and economic outcomes has been established empirically for developing 
countries and for global datasets, it has not been analyzed for the countries that represent the 
gold standard of institutions today.  
 Analysis of institutions among developed countries is inhibited by the absence of 
established instruments.  Popular instruments in the institutions literature are shown to be 
relevant only for the global sample or for developing countries. We hypothesize that the notion 
of the hierarchy of institutions may provide sufficiently strong instruments and utilize 
political/constitutional institutions to serve as instruments for economic institutions. To do so, we 
show that they lead to very similar results when applied to the same groups of countries as the 
established instruments.  The political institutions also pass all relevant statistical tests when they 
are employed only in the OECD subsample.  We find substantial evidence of parameter 
heterogeneity in economic institutions: the impact of Hall and Jones’ (1999) economic 
institutions on income in OECD countries is only one third of the effect that the same institutions 
exert in Non-OECD countries. 
 Our results are robust to different specifications regarding time periods, different sets of 
political variables, and to a number of different samples splits. Most surprising is perhaps, that 
the established instruments which perform strongly in the global sample, such as Latitude and 
European Languages, do not perform in either the OECD or the Non-OECD sample.
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Figure 1  
Institutions and Economic Performance 
OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
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Data source: Hall and Jones (1999)
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Table 1 
Explanatory Power of Institutions and Instruments 
First Evidence for Parameter Heterogeneity (2SLS) 
 
 (I) Hall and Jones (1999) 
(II) 
Global Sample 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
  Institutions♦ 
 
5.085*** 
(0.545)  
5.580*** 
(1.268) 
  
OECD Dummy 
  
0.340*** 
(0.052) 
-0.583 
(0.522) 
  English Language 
Fraction 
0.136 
(0.092)  
0.054 
(0.080)  
  European Language 
Fraction 
0.170*** 
(0.056)  
0.098** 
(0.049)  
  Implied  Trade 
Share 
0.044* 
(0.025)  
0.061*** 
(0.022)  
  
Latitude 0.004*** (0.001)  
0.001 
(0.001)  
N 127 127 127 127 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.41 0.48 0.35 
Over-ID Test  0.243  0.044** 
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. The First stage always 
includes the fraction of the population speaking English or another European Language 
(English Fraction and European Fraction), the Implied Trade Share from a gravity trade 
equation (Implied Trade Share) and the geographical Latitude of a country. The second 
stage regresses the log of income per worker on the instrumented economic institutional 
variable. The 2SLS regression (II) adds a Dummy for OECD membership in 1999 to both 
stages. Over-ID Test is the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan Test statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions of all (but one) Instrument, the joint null being that the instruments are valid.  
The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 2 
Performance of Institutions and Instruments 
Power of Instruments Across Subsamples (2SLS) 
 
 
 
(III) 
OECD 
(IV) 
Non-OECD 
(Va) 
WB High Income 
(VIa) 
WB Non High Income 
(Vb) 
WB High & Upper 
Middle Income 
(VIb) 
WB Non High & Non 
Upper Middle Income 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
      
Institutions♦ 
 
1.845*** 
(0.456)  
5.771*** 
(1.627)  
1.184* 
(0.652)  
6.635*** 
(2.213)  
2.226*** 
(0.445)  
3.241 
(2.596) 
      English 
Lang. 
Fraction 
0.159 
(0.125)  
0.019 
(0.117)  
0.067 
(0.096)  
0.048 
(0.104)  
0.133 
(0.103)  
-0.021 
(0.134)  
      European 
Lang. 
Fraction 
0.134 
(0.089)  
0.085 
(0.059)  
0.028 
(0.064)  
0.094* 
(0.053)  
0.044 
(0.079)  
0.079 
(0.061)  
Implied 
Trade Share 
0.046 
(0.044)  
0.066** 
(0.027)  
-0.015 
(0.031)  
0.026 
(0.025)  
0.005 
(0.036)  
0.015 
(0.026)  
      Latitude 0.003* (0.002)  
-0.000 
(0.001)  
0.003** 
(0.001)  
-0.000 
(0.001)  
0.004*** 
(0.001)  
-0.001 
(0.001)  
N 29 29 98 98 31 31 96 96 50 50 77 77 
Adj. R-
squared 0.26 0.76 0.09 0.000 0.22 0.20 0.08 -0.31 0.28 0.42 0.04 0.23 
Over-ID Test  0.059*  0.0029***  0.423  0.005***  0.469  0.000*** 
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses.  . Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. First stage 
always includes the fraction of the population speaking English or another European Language (English Fraction and European Fraction), the Implied Trade 
Share from a gravity trade equation (Implied Trade Share) and the geographical Latitude of a country; Second stage regresses the log of income per worker only 
on the instrumented economic institutional variable.  Overid Test is the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan Test statistic of overidentifying restrictions of all (but one) 
Instrument, the joint null being that the instruments are valid. Columns (V) and (VI) split the sample according to the World bank’s classifications of High, 
Medium and Low Income countries. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 3 
Institutions and New Instruments: 
The Hierarchy of Institutions (2SLS) 
 
 (VII) Global Sample 
(VIII) 
Global Sample 
(IX) 
Global Sample 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
   
Institutions♦ 
 
4.870*** 
(0.503)  
4.871*** 
(0.455)  
5.789*** 
(1.020) 
    
OECD Dummy 
    
0.300*** 
(0.043) 
-0.628 
(0.441) 
   
Executive Constraints 0.040*** (0.012)  
0.036*** 
(0.012)  
0.009 
(0.011)  
   
Executive Recruitment Regulation 0.091** (0.042)  
0.067 
(0.041)  
0.109*** 
(0.036)  
     English Language 
Fraction   
0.079 
(0.086)    
     European Language 
Fraction   
0.047 
(0.058)    
     
Implied Trade Share 
  
0.053** 
(0.026)    
     
Latitude 
  
0.002*** 
(0.001)    
N 114 114 114 114 114 114 
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.33 
Over-ID Test  0.355  0.125  0.831 
Over-ID C-Test for Political 
Institutions subset    0.104   
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, **, ***, 
respectively. The First stage always includes Constraints on the Executive (Executive Constraints) and Regulation of Chief Executive 
Recruitment (Executive Recruitment Regulation). The fraction of the population speaking English or another European Language 
(English Fraction and European Fraction), the Implied Trade Share from a gravity trade equation (Implied Trade Share) and the 
geographical Latitude of a country and finally a dummy indicating OECD membership as of 1999 are subsequently added; Second stage 
regresses the log of income per worker only on the instrumented economic institutional variable.  The Over-ID Test reports the p-value 
of the Hansen-Sargan Test statistic of overidentifying restrictions of all (but one) Instrument, the joint null being that the instruments are 
valid. Over-ID, C-Test is the p-value of the C-statistic when testing the over-identifying restriction for the two political instruments vis-
à-vis the established ones. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 4 
Hierarchy of Institutions and Parameter Heterogeneity (2SLS) 
 
` 
(X) 
OECD 
 
 
(XI) 
OECD 
(global sample with 
interaction terms) 
(XII) 
Non-OECD 
 
 
(XIII) 
Non-OECD  
(global sample with 
interaction terms) 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
    
Institutions♦ 
 
2.317*** 
(0.257)  
2.317*** 
(.806)  
7.529*** 
(1.849)  
7.529*** 
(1.139) 
    
OECD Dummy 
  
-0.473** 
(0.219) 
2.664*** 
(0.762)   
  
      
Non - OECD Dummy 
      
0.473** 
(0.219) 
-2.664*** 
(0.762) 
    
Executive Constraints 0.027 (0.027)  
0.005 
(0.010)  
0.005 
(0.011)  
0.027 
(0.045)  
    Executive Recruitment 
Regulation 
0.323*** 
(0.086)  
0.085** 
(0.035)  
0.085** 
(0.038)  
0.323** 
(0.144)  
N 27 27 114 114 87 87 114 114 
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.76 0.60 0.59 0.14 0.52 0.60 0.59 
Over-ID Test  0.584  NA  0.974  NA 
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, **, ***, 
respectively. The First stage always includes Constraints on the Executive (Executive Constraints) and Regulation of Chief Executive 
Recruitment (Executive Recruitment). For columns (XI) and (XIII) the specified dummy (OECD or Non-OECD) is included as well as 
interactions of that dummy with Executive Constraints and Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment are added in first stage. The Second 
stage includes the predicted institutions value as well as an interacted predicted institutions value with a (Non-) OECD dummy plus the 
dummy. The reported coefficients for institutions in the second stage the composite effects of (Institutions♦ + Institutions♦ · Dummy). 
Standard errors for that effect are calculated with the delta method. The Over-ID Test is the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan Test statistic of 
overidentifying restrictions of all (but one) Instrument, the joint null being that the instruments are valid. The “♦”superscript indicates 
instrumented variables. 
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Table 5:   
Instrument Robustness 
Political Institutions in 1900 
 
 (XIV) Global 
(XV) 
OECD 
(XVI) 
Non-OECD 
 Institutions1989 Y/L Institutions1989 Y/L Institutions1989 Y/L 
   Institutions1989♦  
2.657*** 
(0.378)  
1.790*** 
(0.41)  
1.284 
(2.607) 
   Executive 
Constraints1900 
0.057*** 
(0.011)  
0.050*** 
(0.015)  
0.013 
(0.018)  
   Executive Recruitment 
Regulation1900 
0.110** 
(0.043)  
0.129 
(0.108)  
0.046 
(0.042)  
N 46 46 22 22 24 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.52 0.56 0.43 0.69 0.08 0.02 
Over-ID Test  0.528  0.116  0.540 
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, **, ***, 
respectively.  The First stage always includes Constraints on the Executive (Executive Constraints) and Regulation of Chief Executive 
Recruitment (Executive Recruitment) in 1900. Economic Institutions are the ones in 1989. Early political institutions data limitations 
reduce the sample size to 112 for the global sample. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 6 
Instrument Robustness 
Factor Analysis: All Political Variables 
 
 (XVII) 
Global 
(XVIII) 
OECD  
(IXX) 
Non OECD 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
   
Institutions♦ 
 
4.029*** 
(0.460)  
2.148***
(0.259)  
5.690***
(1.931) 
   
Democratic Rules 0.129*** (0.020)  
0.117*** 
(0.033)  
0.055 
(0.021)***  
   Participation /  
Stability 
0.081*** 
(0.020)  
0.108*** 
(0.028)  
0.001 
(0.022)  
N 101 101 27 27 74 74 
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.56 0.76 0.77 0.10 0.03 
Over-ID Test  0.862  0.432  0.244 
Notes: Not reported: Intercept; robust Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated 
by *, **, ***, respectively. Democratic Rules and Participation/Stability are the first two rotated factors from a factor analysis 
on all political variables (Good Democracy, Polity2, Regime Durability, Executive Recruitment Regulation, Competitiveness of 
Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Executive Constraints, Regulation of Participation, 
Competitiveness of Participation, Executive Recruitment, Political Competition, Democratic Accountability, Legislative 
Electoral Competition, Executive Electoral Competition, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability). The “♦”superscript 
indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 7 
Instrument Robustness 
Persson’s (2004) Political Institutions 
 
 (XX) 
Global 
(XXI) 
OECD 
(XXII) 
Non OECD 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
   Institutions♦ 
 
3.901***
(0.351)  
2.627***
(0.385)  
3.291***
(0.834) 
  Form of Democratic 
Government 
0.224*** 
(0.034)  
0.050 
(0.084)  
0.209*** 
(0.042)  
  
Age of Democracy 0.541*** (0.077)  
0.430*** 
(0.107)  
0.280* 
(0.149)  
N 112 112 27 27 85 85 
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.40 0.72 0.29 0.33 
Over-ID Test  0.265  0.664  0.029** 
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are 
indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. First stage always includes Parliamentary Democracy and Age of Democracy 
from Persson (2005). The instrumented institutions is Hall and Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure and income per 
worker is from their dataset as well. Adding the Persson (2004) data reduces the sample size to 112 for the global 
sample. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 8  
Instrument Robustness 
La Porta et al (2004) Judicial Institutions 
 
 (XXIII) 
Global 
(XXIV) 
OECD 
(XXV) 
Non OECD 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
   Institutions♦  
2.790*** 
(0.540)  
1.397** 
(0.611)  
2.730* 
(1.657) 
German legal 
Origin 
0.364*** 
(0.101)  
0.186* 
(0.096)  
0.354* 
(0.197)  
Scandinavian 
Legal Origin 
0.335*** 
(0.120)  
0.099 
(0.085)  NA
♣  
Supreme Court 
Judge Tenure 
0.128** 
(0.056)  
0.196* 
(0.104)  
0.061 
(0.053)  
Constitutional 
Review 
-0.057 
(0.119)  
0.003 
(0.116)  
-0.091 
(0.137)  
N 60 60 24 24 36 36 
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.61 0.24 0.59 0.14 0.27 
Over-ID Test  0.670  0.722  0.466 
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. First stages include only the 4 variables from La Porta et al (2004) as 
specified in the main text. The instrumented institutions is Hall and Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure and 
income per worker is from their dataset as well. The use of the La Porta et al (2004) dataset reduces the 
sample size to 60 for the global sample. ♣ Dropped due to collinearity. The “♦”superscript indicates 
instrumented variables. 
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Table 9 
Outlier Robust Estimation 
OECD Regressions  
 
 
(III’) 
Hall and Jones  
Specification 
(X’) 
Hierarchy of Institutions 
Specification  
(XV’) 
Hierarchy of Institutions 
Specification (1900) 
(XVIII’) 
Hierarchy of 
Institutions  
(Factor Analysis) 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
Institutions♦  0.607 (1.289)  
2.381*** 
(.217)  
1.097*** 
(0.417)  
2.633*** 
(0.2319) 
English Language Fraction 0.025 (0.0678)        
European Language. 
Fraction 
0.039 
(0.048)        
Implied Trade Share -0.0125 (0.024)        
Latitude 0.003*** (0.001)        
Executive Constraints    -0.024 (0.051)  
0.050*** 
(0.017)    
Executive Recruitment 
Regulation   
0.522*** 
(0.191)  
0.131 
(0.120)    
Democratic Rules     
 
  
 
 
0.0932*** 
(.030)  
Participation / 
Stability       
0.1836*** 
(.0350)  
N 29 29 25 25 22 22 26 26 
Notes: Not reported: intercept; standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated 
by *, **, ***, respectively. The number of observations in the 2SLS regression (X’) is reduced to 25 as compared to 27 
in (X) because the outlying observation Turkey and South Korea are dropped in the robust regression. R-square and 
Over-ID Tests are not applicable with these methods. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 10 
Bootstrapped Results 
OECD Regressions 
 
 
(III’’) 
Hall and Jones  
Specification 
(X’’) 
Hierarchy of Institutions 
Specification  
(XV’’) 
Hierarchy of Institutions 
Specification (1900) 
(XVIII’’) 
Hierarchy of 
Institutions  
(Factor Analysis) 
 Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L Institutions Y/L 
Institutions♦  1.845*** (0.558)  
2.317*** 
(0.334)  
1.790** 
(0.734)  
2.148*** 
( .3979) 
English Language 
Fraction 
0.159 
(0.181)        
European Language 
Fraction 
0.133* 
(0.079)        
Implied Trade Share 0.046 (0.072)        
Latitude 0.003* (0.002)        
Executive 
Constraints    
.0271 
(0.040)  
0.050** 
(0.022)    
Executive 
Recruitment 
Regulation  
  0.323** (0.153)  
0.129 
(0.098)    
Democratic Rules       0.117** (.05386)  
Participation / 
Stability       
0.108** 
(.04893)  
N 
29 29 27 27 22 22 27 27 
Notes: Not reported: Intercept; Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (from 10000 replications). Significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. R-square and Over-ID Tests are not applicable with 
these methods. The “♦” superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
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Table 11 
Hierarchy of Institutions in Alternative Datasets 
Risk of Expropriation across Subsets 
 
 (XXVI) 
All Countries 
(XXVII) 
Former Colonies 
(XXVIII) 
OECD 
(IXXX) 
Non-OECD 
 Risk of Expropriation Y/L 
Risk of 
Expropriation Y/L 
Risk of 
Expropriation Y/L 
Risk of 
Expropriation Y/L 
Risk of 
Expropriation♦  
0.647***
(0.064)  
0.742***
(0.120)  
0.662***
(0.100)  
0.844***
(0.227) 
Executive 
Constraints 
0.341*** 
(0.079)  
0.226*** 
(0.119)  
-0.059 
(0.210)  
.521** 
(.261)  
Executive 
Recruit. Reg. 
0.485* 
(0.269)  
0.394 
(0.383)  
1.700*** 
(0.604)  
.075* 
(.0829)  
N 105 105 60 60 26 26 79 79 
Adj. R-sq 0.33 0.60 0.24 0.52 0.59 0.72 0.10 -0.062 
Over-ID Test  0.11  0.75  0.24  0.219 
Notes: Not reported: Intercept; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are 
indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. First stage always includes Constraints on the Executive (Executive Constraints) 
and Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (Executive Recruitment). The (instrumented) economic institutional 
variable now is Risk of Expropriation from McArthur and Sachs (2001) as is income per worker. Over-ID Test is the p-
value of the Hansen-Sargan Test statistic of overidentifying restrictions of all (but one) Instrument, the joint null being 
that the instruments are valid. The “♦”superscript indicates instrumented variables. 
 42
Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Correlation Matrix of Political Institutions 
 
Polity2 
index 
Executive 
Recruitment
Competitiveness 
of Executive 
Recruit. 
Good 
Democracy
Executive 
Constraints 
Political 
Competition
Competitiveness 
of Participation 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Regulation 
Executive 
Electoral 
Competition 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Polity2 index 1.00          
Executive 
Recruitment 0.95 1.00         
Competitiveness of 
Executive Recruit. 0.91 0.86 1.00        
Good Democracy 0.98 0.92 0.92 1.00       
Executive 
Constraints 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.95 1.00      
Political 
Competition 0.96 0.85 0.83 0.94 0.88 1.00     
Competitiveness of 
Participation 0.94 0.83 0.81 0.93 0.87 0.98 1.00    
Executive 
Recruitment 
Regulation 
0.70 0.62 0.84 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.66 1.00   
Executive Electoral 
Competition 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.50 1.00  
Democratic 
Accountability 0.75 0.65 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.53 0.65 1.00 
Voice and 
Accountability 0.68 0.59 0.60 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.48 0.60 0.88 
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
0.42 0.31 0.63 0.42 0.54 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.35 0.46 
Legislative 
Electoral 
Competition 
0.54 0.50 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.40 0.87 0.54 
Political Stability 0.40 0.30 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.35 0.38 0.65 
Regime Durability 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.40 
Regulation of 
Participation 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.30 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix of Political Institutions 
 
Voice and 
Accountability
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Legislative 
Electoral 
Competition 
Political 
Stability 
Regime 
Durability 
Regulation of 
Participation 
Voice and 
Accountability 1.00      
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
0.33 1.00     
Legislative Electoral 
Competition 0.47 0.43 1.00    
Political Stability 0.80 0.22 0.28 1.00   
Regime Durability 0.38 0.11 0.35 0.27 1.00  
Regulation of 
Participation 0.34 -0.05 0.16 0.33 0.45 1.00 
Notes: based on the 109 observations for which all data was available.
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Table A2 
The Hierarchy of Institutions Factor Analysis 
(Rotated Factor Loadings) 
 
  Factors 
  1 2 3 
Rule of Law 0.35 0.88 0.14
Government effectiveness 0.35 0.87 0.14
Corruption 0.32 0.87 0.17
Government Anti-Diversion Policies 0.32 0.85 0.27
Social Infrastructure 0.41 0.85 -0.02
Regulatory Quality 0.37 0.79 0.01
Economic Institutions
Years Open 0.42 0.74 -0.18
Polity2 index 0.93 0.32 0.08
Executive Recruitment 0.90 0.24 0.02
Competitiveness of Executive Recruit. 0.90 0.24 0.24
Good Democracy 0.89 0.37 0.13
Executive Constraints 0.88 0.29 0.21
Political Competition 0.88 0.38 0.04
Competitiveness of Participation 0.81 0.47 0.12
Executive Recruitment Regulation 0.77 0.25 0.15
Executive Electoral Competition 0.58 0.33 0.53
Democratic Accountability 0.52 0.66 0.30
Voice and Accountability 0.44 0.77 0.17
Openness of Executive Recruitment 0.43 0.01 0.56
Legislative Electoral Competition 0.42 0.26 0.67
Political Stability 0.19 0.81 0.06
Regime Durability 0.09 0.49 0.36
Political Institutions 
Regulation of Participation -0.26 0.55 0.31
Note: based on 103 observations for which all data was available. 
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Table A3 
Factor Analysis of Political Institutions  
(Global Sample, Rotated Factor Loadings) 
 
 Factors 
 
“Democratic 
Rules” 
“Participation and 
Stability” 
Polity2 index 0.94 -0.04 
Good Democracy 0.93 0.11 
Executive Recruit. Competitiveness 0.91 -0.07 
Political Competition 0.88 -0.08 
Executive Constraints  0.87 0.04 
Competitiveness of Exec. Recruit. 0.86 0.06 
Competitiveness of Participation 0.84 0.05 
Executive Recruitment Regulation 0.76 0.27 
Democratic Accountability 0.56 0.19 
Executive Electoral Competition 0.55 0.08 
Voice and Accountability 0.49 0.19 
Legislative Electoral Competition 0.35 0.13 
Openness of Executive Recruitment 0.25 -0.08 
Political Stability 0.24 0.20 
Regime Durability 0.18 0.52 
Regulation of Participation -0.09 0.79 
Note: based on 109 observations for which all data was available. 
